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The Reagan Doctrine, the 2003 Invasion of
Iraq, and the Role of a Sole Superpower
Anthony S. Winer*

Introduction
This Essay compares two doctrines of United States foreign
policy.
The first is the Reagan Doctrine, which achieved
prominence in national discourse during the two presidential
administrations of Ronald Reagan.' The second is the National
Security Strategy (NSS), issued by President George W. Bush in
the fall of 2002, developed in response to the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks on the United States. 2 The NSS could be
described as a "Bush Doctrine" on the use of preemptive selfdefense in U.S. foreign policy.3
The particular focus of the
comparison in this Essay is the relationship of the Reagan
Doctrine and the Bush Doctrine to the international law on the use
of force. This comparison will yield some tentative conclusions
about the consequences of the United States serving, in some
senses, as the world's sole superpower.

* Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.
1. See infra Part III.
2. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsctnss.pdf
(last visited Mar. 26, 2004) [hereinafter NSS].
3. Many commentators have discerned a "Bush Doctrine" in foreign policy, and of
course there have been various views as to what such a doctrine entails. It is clear,
however, that a substantial proportion of these commentators view the doctrine of
preemptive self-defense, one of the more prominent elements of the National
Security Strategy, as the primary characteristic of the "Bush Doctrine." See, e.g.,
Bryan Bender, North Korea, Iran Seen as More Receptive to U.S., BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 4, 2004, at Al (referencing a "Bush doctrine of preemptive defense,
threatening 'rogue states' with military force"); Rod Dreher, Texan of the Year
President George W Bush, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 4, 2004, at 1H (defining
the "Bush Doctrine," with perhaps deliberate exaggeration, as "the principle that
the United States reserves the right to strike any nation that threatens it,
imminently or not, without permission and without apology"); Charles
Krauthammer, The Doggedness of War, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2003, at A35
(referencing "a clearly enunciated policy-now known as the Bush Doctrine--of
targeting, by preemptive war if necessary, hostile regimes engaged in terror and/or
refusing to come clean" on weapons of mass destruction).
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Each doctrine was very much a product of its time. The
Reagan Doctrine developed tentatively in a period in which the
United States always had to consider the Soviet Union's reaction. 4
The Bush Doctrine, in contrast, developed more boldly in a period
in which the United States had no counterbalancing superpower to
5
temper its intent.
This Essay will show that the issuance of the NSS, including
its open declarations regarding preemptive self-defense, was a
much more explicit and formally acknowledged act than the
implementation of the Reagan Doctrine, which was stated in much
less formal terms. 6 The issuance of the NSS therefore bespeaks a
greater attention to publicly-stated principles than that evinced in
earlier times, and this can be salutary for international law.7 On
the other hand, this Essay will also show that the substance of
preemptive self-defense under the NSS is more radical than the
Reagan Doctrine.8 Thus, the NSS is certainly no less questionable,
and is probably more questionable under current international
law. 9 Consequently, the NSS, in the context of its preemptive selfdefense statements, produces effects for international law that are
at once potentially salutary in form and problematic in
substance.10 This tension between formal effects that can enhance
the workings of international law, and substantive effects that can
be problematic for it, may be characteristic of things to come if the
United States maintains its role as a sole superpower.
I.

Why Examine Doctrines?

Specifically enunciated doctrines in foreign affairs can have a
constructive effect on the development of international law. Some
4. See generally ALLAN

GERSON,

THE

KIRKPATRICK MISSION:

DIPLOMACY

WITHOUT APOLOGY: AMERICA AT THE UNITED NATIONS 1981-1985, 197-215 (1991)

(describing the "low point in U.S.-Soviet relations" that occurred during Reagan's
presidency).
5. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part VI and accompanying text (describing the differences in the
"respective manners of propagation" of the Reagan Doctrine and the NSS).
7. See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (describing the ways in which the
issuance of "specifically enunciated doctrines in foreign affairs can have a
constructive effect on the development of international law").
8. See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text (describing the ways in which
a "narrow conception of the Reagan Doctrine" is "much more radical" than the
relevant provisions of the NSS).
9. See infra notes 91-103 and accompanying text (noting that the International
Court of Justice "essentially determined that the Reagan Doctrine . . . violated
international law" under the facts of the litigation before it between Nicaragua and
the United States).
10. See infra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.

2004]

THE ROLE OFA SOLE SUPERPOWER

tend to view international affairs as solely matters of brute
strength and political machination;1 these observers may tend to
doubt the character and effectiveness of international law. 12 To
the extent that the foreign policy of powerful states is composed
merely of ad hoc determinations maximizing selfish advantage
from one factual situation to the next, this state of affairs plays
into the hands of international law skeptics. After all, relegating
policy decisions to a set of ad hoc determinations based on nothing
more than physical and political advantage contradicts the rule of
law.
On the other hand, when the officers of an individual state
specify in advance a set of explicit principles upon which they will
conduct foreign policy, the foreign relations of that state appear to
be governed by principle as well as, and perhaps more than, ad hoc
determinations of pure advantage. These principles can have a
dual positive effect on the role of law in international affairs.
First, the rationalizing or guiding effect of enunciating a specific
policy can help to define policy options and increase predictability.
As an experiential matter, this can create a more orderly
Second and more
environment that is conducive to law.
esoterically, distilling foreign policy doctrines into specific
statements can aid in the development of customary international14
law. 13 These doctrines can help both to develop an opino juris

11. Louis Henkin, for many years a professor of international law at the
Columbia Law School and a former President of the American Society of
International Law, has referred to this kind of viewpoint. See LOUIS HENKIN, How
NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 10 (2d ed. 1979) (stating "it is a
common view . . . that the norms of international law are so widely disregarded as
to be largely irrelevant to the behavior of nations. Some have even elevated this
impression to a doctrine, questioning whether one may meaningfully speak of
international norms, of their observance or violation"). Some political science texts
give tacit, or perhaps unintentional, support to this view. See, e.g., ROBERT L.
WENDZEL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A POLICYMAKER Focus 20 (1st ed. 1977)
(stating "in any case where one of the parties perceives a significant threat to its
fundamental objectives it will quickly dispense with legal considerations that might
inhibit their achievement") (emphasis omitted).
12. See HENKIN, supra note 11, at 10.
13. One of the principal sources of international law, apart from treaties and
conventions, is customary international law. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (5th ed. 1998). For a practice among states to be
considered customary international law, the practice must be general, consistent,
and be supported by a conviction that the behavior is legally obligatory. Id. at 4-11.
This conviction of legal obligation is referred to as opino juris. Id. at 7. See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
102(1), (2) (1987) (stating in section 102(2) that "[clustomary international law
results from general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense
of legal obligation").
14. See supra note 13.
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and to guide and model actions of the declaring country and its
allies toward building general and consistent practice.
Of course, enunciated doctrines of foreign policy can amount
to mere political posturing, and may not always be followed.
However, even when not followed, they can be valuable. A state
that enunciates a specific doctrine and then ignores it, or observes
it in a patently invalid way, has nevertheless created the very
yardstick by which others can note the discrepancy between its
stated policy and its behavior. The practice thus advances, albeit
in some cases at the margins, a mechanism whereby the failure of
states to conduct themselves in principled ways can be made more
evident to all.
When these discrepancies are public, the
international community has greater ability to hold the state
accountable.
II. President Bush's "National Security Strategy"Preemptive Self-Defense
On September 17, 2002, President George W. Bush issued the
15
National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Its
date of issuance, of course, was shortly after the first anniversary
of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
The Bush
Administration intended the NSS to announce that United States
foreign policy, after the events of September 11th, would be
conducted according to the dictates of the NSS.
The
Administration drafted the NSS with two elements foremost in
mind: the implications of the events of September llth,16 and the
status of the United States as the world's sole superpower.17
The NSS lists a set of national security goals, which the
White House describes as being based on "a distinctly American
internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our
national interests."' 8 The overriding sentiment of the document is
that the United States must pursue international relations
according to the American values of democracy, freedom, and free
markets,1 9 as well as according to less policy-specific foreign
15. See NSS, supra note 2.
16. See id., at Intro., para. 7 (stating "[t]he events of September 11, 2001, taught
us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national
interests as strong states").
17. See id., at 1 (stating "[t]he United States possesses unprecedented-and
unequaled-strength and influence in the world").
18. See id.
19. See id., at Intro., para. 1 (referencing "freedom, democracy and free
enterprise" as "a single sustainable model for national success" for all countries of
the world).

20041

THE ROLE OFA SOLE SUPERPOWER

of violent conflict and nonrelations values, such as the avoidance
20
intervention in domestic affairs.
In retrospect, it can be seen that the NSS could well have
been part of an advance preparation for the U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq in 2003.21 Some of its provisions are explicit endorsements of
22
the currently much-discussed concept of preemptive self-defense.
For example, in a prominently criticized paragraph regarding the
dangers of terrorism, 23 the NSS states:
20. See id.
Prominent traditional values of international law are nonintervention in internal affairs, territorial integrity, non-use of force, and equality
of voting in the United Nations General Assembly. See generally MALCOLM N.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (5th ed. 2003). These values are based in the basic
state-oriented character of world politics, and spring from the notions of equal
sovereignty in law and equal possession of the basic attributes of statehood among
states. See id. Accordingly, these values derive from the sovereign equality of
states. J.L. Brierly traces the notion of the sovereign equality of states to Emerich
de Vattel. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 37 (6th ed. 1963) (quoting a translated passage from
Emerich de Vattel's Le Droit des Gens (1758) asserting that "nations or sovereign
states must be regarded as so many free persons living together in the state of
nature"). Brierly maintains that Vattel concluded that "since men are naturally
equal, so are states." Id. Brierly himself, however, had less use for a doctrine of
the sovereign equality of states, stating that the doctrine of the equality of states is
"contradicted by obvious facts, for by whatever tests states are measured[,] they are
not equal." Id. at 131. Brierly believed that most principles used to justify a
sovereign equality of states could be derived, not from a purported equality of
states, but from their mutual interdependence. Id. at 131-34.
21. See Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97
AM. J. INT'L. L. 599, 600 (2003) (stating that the Bush Administration issued the
NSS at a time when "President Bush was focused on trying to build domestic and
international support for.a final effort to disarm and dislodge Saddam Hussein").
22. In addition to preemptive self-defense, there is anticipatory and preventive
self-defense. It is possible to distinguish between the three. See, e.g., Thomas
Graham, Jr., National Self-Defense, International Law, and Weapons of Mass
Destruction,4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2003). Graham states:
Arguably, the term anticipatory self-defense could imply action against a
truly imminent, alleged threat, while preventive war could be addressed to
a threat that is yet to fully mature, with preemptive attack somewhere in
between. Even though the three terms are somewhat different, the lines
between them are not clear, and they all involved aggressive action.
Id.
For purposes of this Essay, the distinctions among these terms are not
tremendously significant, although some authorities discern a difference. See
Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 607, 619 (2003). Frank observes that President Bush appeared in the NSS
"to be exponentially expanding the range of permissible preemption, from that of
the Caroline doctrine, which requires a 'necessity of . . . self-defence [that] is
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation,' to something like a balancing of reasonable probabilities." Id.
(quoting letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), quoted in 2
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906)).
23. Among the most academically prominent criticisms of the NSS preemptive
self-defense provisions are those discussed in supra notes 18-22 and accompanying
text and infra notes 24-41 and accompanying text. However, even in the more
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We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by . . .
identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our
borders. While the United States will constantly strive to
enlist the support of the international community, we will not
hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self24
defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists ....
Similarly, and more explicitly, the NSS advances the notion
of preemptive action in the more generalized context of national
security and the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. 25 The
NSS states, "[t]he United States has long maintained the option of
preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national
security. . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our
adversaries,
the
United
States
will, if
necessary,
act
26
preemptively."
These provisions have been decried by commentators. For
example, a recent issue of the American Journal of International
Law contains an academic colloquium debating the consequences
to international law of the current conflict in Iraq.2 7 The NSS
figures prominently in this discussion, and several of the
commentators are critical. 28 Thomas Franck, a professor at the
New York University School of Law and a former President of the
American Society of International Law, maintains in this
discussion that the NSS provisions on preemptive self-defense are
29
antithetical to the Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter).
Professor Franck acknowledges that a doctrine of anticipatory selfpopular foreign-relations press, criticism of the NSS is well documented. In a
recent issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
acknowledges such criticism, but notes that the critics have "exaggerated both the
scope of preemption in foreign policy and the centrality of preemption in U.S.
strategy as a whole." Colin Powell, A Strategy of Partnerships,83 FOR. AFFAIRS 22,

24 (2004). In the same issue, Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter note that
the "limits" of the preemption strategy of the NSS "are demonstrated daily in Iraq,"
although in their view the problem with the strategy "may be that it does not go far
enough." Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83 FOR.
AFFAIRS 136, 136 (2004). Mr. Feinstein is the Acting Director of the Washington
Program of the Council on Foreign Relations; Anne-Marie Slaughter is the Dean of
the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton
University and the current President of the American Society of International Law.
Id.
24. NSS, supra note 2, at 6.
25. Id. at 14-15.
26. Id. at 15.
27. Colloquim, Agora: FuruteImplications of the Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.

553 (2003).
28. See, e.g, Franck, supra note 22, at 607 (providing a critical analysis of the
consequences of the Iraqi invasion on the world of international law).
29. See id. at 619 (criticizing these statements as setting out "the doctrine that
the nation is free to use force against any foe it perceives as a potential threat to its
security, at any time of its choosing and with means at its disposal").
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defense can be reasonable, and has "gained a certain credibility" in
the course of the last two centuries. 30 The classic version of
anticipatory self-defense, in his view, requires a "necessity of...
self-defense [that] is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice
of means, and no moment for deliberation." 31 When those
emergency circumstances exist, the classic view would allow for
32
self-defense in anticipation of the clearly observable threat.
On the other hand, Professor Franck finds the NSS view of
preemptive self-defense to be out of line with this tradition,
because it dispenses with the "instant, overwhelming and leaving
no choice of means" requirement. 33 Instead, the NSS formulation,
in his view, provides for "a right by the United States to determine
for itself whether, and when, the conditions exist to justify
recourse to this expanded right."34 This degree of unilateral power
in the United States would so far exceed what is authorized in the
3
U.N. Charter as to "stand the Charter on its head."
Jane Stromseth, a law professor at Georgetown University
Law Center, acknowledges in the same colloquium that the NSS
"grapples frankly and openly with the exceedingly difficult
36
security challenges posed by terrorists and by rogue states."
However, she maintains that the preemptive self-defense
provisions of the NSS are quite broad and open-ended. 37 She says
that these provisions, in their "expansive" form, have "the
potential to be destabilizing."38 She suggests that if the other
countries were to follow the lead of the United States on this point,
all manner of countries around the world could begin feeling more
justified launching preemptive strikes, thereby decreasing
39
international stability.
Also in the same colloquium, national security expert Miriam
Sapiro criticizes the NSS preemptive self-defense provisions as not
30. Id.
31.

Id.

(quoting 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412

(1906) (explaining the so-called Carolinedoctrine)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq;A TransitionalMoment, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 628, 635 (2003).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 636 (discussing how the expansive nature of the NSS could pose
challenges to the United Nations framework).
39. Id. (citing W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War,
97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 82 (2003)). Reisman states that NSS could result in a lower
threshold to warrant acts of self-defense. Id. at 89.
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reflecting the current state of international law. 40 In her view,
international law prior to the adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945
might have allowed for a comparatively broad view of preemptive
self-defense, but the adoption of the U.N. Charter makes the
41
doctrine considerably more problematic.
In spite of the antagonism it has garnered among
commentators, several aspects of the NSS are significant for
purposes of this discussion. It was issued as both a detailed and
comprehensive text. 42 Comparatively lengthy for a foreign policy
doctrine, it amounts to thirty-one single-spaced printed pages in
fairly small type. It covers a broad range of policy issues,
43
including the proper approach to international alliances,
terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, 44 trade policy, 45 and
the development of democracy. 46 At the same time, its statements
are focused and detailed enough to arguably serve as a somewhat
meaningful guide to future U.S. foreign policy. The NSS includes
numerous statements that provide fairly specific indications of
47
U.S. foreign policy goals in such areas as regional conflicts,

40. See Sapiro, supra note 21, at 600.
41. Id. at 600-01 (explaining that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter imposes a
prohibition against the use of threats or force against another state).
42. See infra notes 113-115 and accompanying text (discussing the length and
format of the NSS).
43. See id. at 5-7 (entitled "Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Terrorism and Work
to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends"). This section emphasizes the role
of U.S. allies in fighting terrorism, referencing the need to co-ordinate efforts to
stem the availability of financing for terrorists, the importance of ranking terrorism
in the international community on a par with slavery, piracy and genocide, and the
policy of supporting moderate and modern government in the Muslim world. Id.
44. Id. at 13-16 (entitled "Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies,
and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction"). This segment focuses
specifically on weapons of mass destruction, and states policy goals regarding
nonproliferation of WMD, effective consequence management upon the use of
WMD, and improved intelligence regarding WMD. Id.
45. See id. at 17-20 (containing several strategies, both specific and general,
assertedly to help expand global trade and economic growth. These include
working with the IMF to streamline lending, facilitating the continuation of the
WTO's Doha Round of negotiations, and participating in or encouraging the
development of regional trade areas).
46. Id. at 21-24 (setting forth measures designed to assist less developed
countries in their further development, with the stated goal of fostering and
encouraging stable democracy). It cites a proposed fifty percent increase in the core
development assistance to be given by the United States, further support for the
World Bank's International Development Association, and further assistance to
education. Id.
47. See id. at 9-10 (discussing the need for America to "stand committed to an
independent and democratic Palestine" and the need for "Israel forces . . . to
withdraw fully to positions they held prior to September 28, 2000").
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international environmental controls, 48 assistance to developing
countries, 49 and foreign relations strategy. 50 Much of the NSS is
admittedly of a political and rhetorical character, but statements
such as these are sufficiently precise and definite to constitute
statements of policy, rather than mere posturing.
Lending further support to the proposition that the NSS
constitutes a policy statement is the fact that the Bush
Administration itself issued the document. 51 The Administration
did not rely on cabinet officers or others to state the doctrine, and
since it was issued in detailed written form there is no doubt about
its content.52 Also, the doctrine was issued over the internet, a
medium ideally suited and designed for rapid and broad public
dissemination.
In these respects the NSS can be profitably compared to the
Reagan Doctrine, an analogous doctrine of U.S. foreign policy that
had substantial effects in the international arena 53 some
seventeen years before the NSS was issued. 54 This Essay will now
turn to an examination of the Reagan Doctrine, the different ways
in which it was viewed in its time, and the objections of some of its
critics, followed by a direct comparison of the two doctrines.
III. The Reagan Doctrine and Its Critics
The

Reagan

Doctrine

was

based

in

various

discrete

48. NSS, supra note 2, at 17-20 (stating that "[olur overall objective is to reduce
America's greenhouse gas emissions ... by 18 percent over the next 10 years," and
stating that the United States remains "committed to the basic U.N. Framework
Convention [on greenhouse gas emissions] for international cooperation," and that
the United States will "increase spending on research and new conservation
technologies, to a total of $4.5 billion").
49. See id. at 21-24 (describing the "Millennium Challenge Account" which
proposes "a 50 percent increase in the core development assistance given by the
United States," and states that "[t]he U.S. will increase its own funding for
education assistance by at least 20 percent, with an emphasis on improving basic
education and teacher training").
50. See id. at 25-28 (confirming "our commitment to the self-defense of Taiwan
under the Taiwan Relations Act," and calling this "one ... profound disagreement"
that the United States has with China; including non-proliferation; "we expect
China to adhere to its nonproliferation commitments").
51. The document was issued by the Bush Administration via the internet as a
compilation of President Bush's speeches. See NSS, supra note 2.
52. Id.
53. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (noting that the Reagan
Doctrine was the basis for the "assistance provided by the U.S. to the Contra
movement from 1981 to 1986" in Nicaragua).
54. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (indicating that the earliest
statement by President Reagan enunciating the contours of a Reagan Doctrine was
his State of the Union address in February of 1985).
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statements that Ronald Reagan made during the course of his
presidency. 55 President Reagan never enunciated the doctrine as a
detailed policy statement, but commentators pieced it together
from his statements and the statements of his Cabinet officers and
56
advisors.
Two statements from President Reagan are the most cited for
enunciations of the Reagan Doctrine. 57 The first of these was a
portion from his February 1985 State of the Union address in
which he stated:
We must stand by our democratic allies. And we must not
break faith with those who are risking their lives-on every
continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua-to defy Soviet
supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours
from birth ....
Support for freedom fighters is self-defense...
58

The second was a portion of his 1985 speech at the Bitburg
Air Force Base in what was then still West Germany. There
Reagan stated:

55. See generally JEANE KIRKPATRICK, THE REAGAN DOCTRINE & U.S. FOREIGN

[hereinafter KIRKPATRICK].
56. Id. at 10.
The primary exponent of the Reagan Doctrine was Jeane
Kirkpatrick. However, others who made contemporary statements evoking or
deriving from the Reagan Doctrine included Secretary of State George P. Shultz
and U.S. Representative Jack Kemp. Shultz stated:
The American People have a long and noble tradition of supporting the
struggle of other peoples for freedom, democracy and independence ....
So
long as communist dictatorships feel free to aid and abet insurgencies in
the name of 'socialist internationalism,' why must the democracies-the
target of this threat-be inhibited from defending their own interests and
the cause of democracy itself? ... Our nation's vital interest and moral
responsibility require us to stand by our friends in their struggle for
freedom ....
George P. Shultz, New Realities and New Ways of Thinking, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 705,
713 (1985). Similarly, Kemp stated:
The Reagan Doctrine in foreign policy takes as its central theme the idea
that America is the leader of the Free World. This is not rhetoric, it is
principle; and it carries with it responsibility. It is the guiding force
behind our acts: to protect freedom where it exists, and to advance
freedom where it is denied.
Jack Kemp, Introduction, in KIRKPATRICK, supra note 55, at 1.
57. Jeane Kirkpatrick herself cited these two statements in one of her most
direct statements of the Reagan Doctrine. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 55, at 10-11.
The State-of-the-Union quotation appeared prominently in a contemporary Cato
Institute policy analysis. Ted Galen Carpenter, U.S. Aid to Anti-Communist
Rebels: The 'Reagan Doctrine' and Its Pitfalls, 74 CATO POL'Y ANALYSIS 1986.
Kirkpatrick again included the Bitburg quotation in her contributing essay to Right
v. Might. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human
POLICY (1985)

Rights, and International Law, in LOUIS HENKIN, ET AL. RIGHT V. MIGHT:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 19, 22 (2d ed. 1991).

58. President's Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the
Union, 1985 PUB. PAPERS 135 (Feb. 6, 1985).
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Twenty-two years ago, President John F. Kennedy went to the
Berlin Wall and proclaimed that he, too, was a Berliner. Well,
today freedom loving people around the world must say: I am
a Berliner. I am a Jew in a world still threatened by antiSemitism. I am an Afghan, and I am a prisoner of the Gulag.
I am a refugee in a crowded boat foundering off the coast of
Vietnam. I am a Laotian, a Cambodian, a Cuban and a
in Nicaragua. I, too, am a potential victim of
Miskito Indian 59
totalitarianism.
Taken together, these announcements evince a solidarity
with countries that were considered to be controlled by Communist
regimes allied with the Soviet Union. They bear the mark,
particularly in their equation of communism with totalitarianism,
of the intellectual influence of Jeane Kirkpatrick.6 0
Ms.
Kirkpatrick was the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations under
President Reagan from 1981 to 1985, and was very influential in
the formulation of his foreign policy.
Kirkpatrick came to President Reagan's attention through
the publication of a now-famous essay in the magazine
Commentary.61 She therein drew a distinction between what she
regarded as totalitarian and authoritarian regimes: totalitarian
regimes (such as communist regimes and the theocracy in
Khomeini's Iran) denied their people all freedoms, including
religious tolerance, whereas merely authoritarian regimes (such as
Somoza's Nicaragua and the Shah's Iran) imposed somewhat less
comprehensive restrictions on liberties. 62 She maintained that
totalitarian regimes were worse than authoritarian regimes,
because authoritarian regimes could be more likely to change and
develop democratically. 63 Accordingly, there was a basis for
treating authoritarian regimes more favorably than totalitarian

59. President's Remarks at a Joint German-American Military Ceremony at
Bitburg Air Base in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1985 PUB. PAPERS 567 (May

5,1985).
60. Kirkpatrick consistently had the confidence of President Reagan throughout
her term of service at the United Nations. GERSON, supra note 4, at 40 (noting that
"she had the confidence of President Reagan, and was told by him that he would
treat her as a full-fledged Cabinet member and not simply as someone who held
Cabinet rank ....
); see also id. at 68 (asserting that "[p]erhaps more than any
other U.S. Permanent Representative in the past, she would use her warm and
sympathetic reception in the Oval Office to good political advantage").
61. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, COMMENTARY,
Nov. 1979, at 34-45, reprinted in
DOUBLE STANDARDS 49-52 (1982).

JEANE J.

KIRKPATRICK, DICTATORSHIPS AND

62. See GERSON, supra note 4, at xv (describing this distinction and providing
these specific examples).
63. Id.
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regimes in U.S. foreign policy. 64 This thesis appealed to President
Reagan, and Kirkpatrick continued to enjoy his confidence
throughout her tenure at the U.N.65
Indeed, Ms. Kirkpatrick had various opportunities to speak
and elucidate upon the Reagan Doctrine. The most authoritative
of these was in a group study sponsored by the Council of Foreign
Relations in 1989, which was published in book form under the
title Right v. Might.66 In some senses, Right v. Might is entirely
about the Reagan Doctrine.
The issues that instigated the
convocation of the study all occurred during Reagan's presidency:
the 1983 Grenada invasion, the bombing of Libya in 1986, the
mining of Nicaraguan harbors by the CIA and covert and overt aid
to the Contras.6 7 All of these occurrences evinced President
Reagan's approach to foreign relations. It is accordingly only
natural that in discussing them, the Reagan Doctrine would
regularly surface in the Right v. Might essays, even if not all of
them directly involved application of the Doctrine.
The contributors to the group study included some of the
most prominent foreign policy commentators of the day. In
addition to Ms. Kirkpatrick, they included Louis Henkin, Stanley
Hoffman of Harvard University, William D. Rogers, a former
Assistant Secretary of State, and David Scheffer, who is currently
at the Georgetown University Law Center.
Each of these
observers commented at length on aspects of the Reagan Doctrine.
They had quite divergent views, not only as to its merits but also
as to what it actually said. This divergence of views as to actual
content no doubt existed, at least in substantial part, because
President Reagan never provided a single detailed formulation of

64. It was on this basis that Kirkpatrick considered, for example, President
Carter's policies regarding the replacement of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua by
the leftist Sandinistas as blameworthy. Id. at xv.
65. The Commentary essay was one of the prime bases for her appointment to
the U.N. post. Id. at xv. See also supra note 60. See also Naomi B. Lynn, Jeane
Kirkpatrick: From the University to the United Nations, in WOMEN LEADERS IN
CONTEMPORARY U.S. POLITICS 91, 96 (Frank P. Le Veness & Jane P. Sweeney eds.,
1987) (asserting that "[t]here is little doubt that Jeane Kirkpatrick has had a
substantial impact on the Reagan administration's foreign policy. During her
tenure as U.S. ambassador she had easy and direct access to the president, often to
the chagrin of two secretaries of state").
66. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 57 (this book was first published in 1989 and then
in this expanded form two years later). An earlier authoritative source was
Kirkpatrick's monograph published by the Heritage Foundation. See KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 55. The 1979 Commentary article, discussed above and cited in supra
note 61, was also certainly a substantial precursor to the Reagan Doctrine.
67. John Temple Swing, Foreword, in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 57, at vii, x.
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the Reagan Doctrine. 68
Most of those who were critical of the Reagan Doctrine
viewed it as a broad and bald assertion of the United States' right
to simply intervene, by direct military force if necessary, in any
country around the world in which democratic rule was
threatened. Louis Henkin described the Doctrine as espousing
"the right to intervene by force in another state to preserve or
impose democracy." 69 David Scheffer also described the Reagan
Doctrine as the "rhetorical promotion of democracy . . . as a
70
justification for the use of force."
In this context, the Reagan Doctrine could be seen as a
response to the Brezhnev Doctrine, named for the Soviet leader
After the Soviet invasion of
during the ddtente era. 71
asserted that the Soviet Union
Brezhnev
1968,
in
Czechoslovakia
had the inherent authority to maintain communism in any
72
existing communist state when that system became threatened.
A formal statement of the Brezhnev Doctrine appeared as part of a
1968 article in Pravdain which Brezhnev stated:
The peoples of the socialist countries and Communist parties
certainly do have and should have freedom for determining the
ways of advance of their respective countries.
However, none of their decisions should damage either
socialism in their country or the fundamental interests of
other socialist countries, and the whole working class
movement, which is working for socialism.
This means that each Communist party is responsible not only
to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the
Whoever forgets this, in
entire Communist movement.
stressing only the independence of the Communist party,

68. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
69. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 57, at 44.
70. David J. Scheffer, Use of Force After the Cold War: Panama, Iraq and the
New World Order, in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 57, at 119.
71. Leonid Brezhnev became general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in
1966, and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1977. PAUL J.
MURPHY, BREZHNEV: SOVIET POLITIcIAN 248-49, 313 (1981). He held both posts
until his death in 1982.
72. See generally John Norton Moore, The Brezhnev Doctrine and the Radical
Assault on the Legal Order, in JOHN NORTON MOORE & ROBERT F.
INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 1 (1987).

TURNER,

This doctrine, most explicitly formulated in connection with the 1968
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, asserts a legal right for the Soviet
Union to intervene militarily anywhere in the world to make certain that
once a nation adopts a communist system it will never be permitted to
change its form of government-that is, it will never depart from the
'sbcialist' camp.
Id. at9.
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becomes one-sided. He deviates from his international duty. 73
Although Brezhnev's statements professed respect for the
self-determination of people within these countries, he made it
clear that the paramount value was actually the maintenance of
socialism and "the fundamental interests of other socialist
countries" in waging the "struggle for socialism. '74 By this view,
the Reagan Doctrine was simply the mirror image of the Brezhnev
Doctrine, the latter attempting to make the world safe for
socialism, the former attempting to make the world safe for
democracy. Indeed, Stanley Hoffman maintained, apparently with
some degree of sarcasm, that the Reagan Doctrine was a
"provocative stratagem [to] reciprocate for the evil designs of the
Brezhnev Doctrine ....
IV. A Narrower View of the Reagan Doctrine
Although the critics of the Reagan Doctrine tended to view it
as a broad assertion of U.S. military authority, its primary
exponent stated the Doctrine in more limited terms. Jeane
Kirkpatrick noted the tendency of critics to describe a broad
variety of actions by the Reagan Administration as illustrations of
the Reagan Doctrine. Among the illustrations she noted were the
U.S. intervention in Grenada in 1983, the bombing of Libya in
1986, and the mining of Nicaraguan harbors in 1984.76 However,
by her description, none of these actions was an apt illustration of
the Doctrine. Instead, she contended that the Reagan Doctrine
was narrowly focused on the "moral legitimacy" of U.S. support for
indigenous insurgencies in communist states, which maintained
governments against the popular will and with the substantial

73. Id. at 10 (citing N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1968, at 3).
74. Kirkpatrick and Gerson provide the following quote as a statement of the
Brezhnev Doctrine:
There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the
Communist parties have and must have freedom to determine their
country's path of development. However any decision of theirs must
damage neither socialism in their country, nor the fundamental interests
of other socialist countries, nor the world-wide workers' movement, which
is waging a struggle for socialism.
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights and
International Law, in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 57, at 29, citing 20 CURRENT
DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS 10-12 (Joint Committee on Slavic and East European
Studies, Oct. 16, 1968), quoting S. Kovalev, Sovereignty and the International
Obligationsof Socialist Countries,PRAVDA, Sept. 26, 1968.
75. Stanley Hoffman, Ethics and Rules of the Game Between the Superpowers, in
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 57, at 71.

76. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 74, at 19.
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material support of the Soviet bloc or other communist sources. 77
Accordingly, the Reagan Doctrine required for its application both
a state governed within the ambit of Soviet influence and an
indigenous resistance movement battling against the regime.
One basis for insisting on such a narrow view was the legal
and philosophical foundation on which Kirkpatrick pinned the
Doctrine. She argued that the Reagan Doctrine was based on the
core values of the United States Declaration of Independence,
which embodies the right of self-determination.7 8 She quoted the
famous sentence from the Declaration that "governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed," in order to secure the rights of "life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness." 79 A government that was instituted in
contravention of the consent of those it governed, and that did not
secure "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," was, therefore,
not legitimate.
It might have been objected, of course, that the Declaration of
Independence was an instrument of the U.S. domestic legal and
political tradition, rather than of international law. In particular,
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter articulated the principle of nonBy
intervention into the governments of other countries.80
transposing the Declaration of Independence and the American
values it embodied into the context of international law, she
introduced an interesting rhetorical (and perhaps analytical)
strategy.
She noted, without specifically citing, the U.N. Charter's
generalized purposes as stated in Article 1.81 These purposes
77. Id. at 20, stating that:
The Reagan Doctrine, as we understand it, was above all concerned with
the moral legitimacy of U.S. support-including military support-for
insurgencies under certain circumstances: where there are indigenous
opponents to a government that is maintained by force, rather than
popular consent; where such a government depends on arms supplied by
the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc, or other foreign sources; and where the
people are denied a choice regarding their affiliations and future.

Id.
78. Id. at 23 ("Mirroring basic American Constitutional principles, the Reagan
Doctrine rests on the claim that legitimate government depends on the consent of
the governed and on its respect for the rights of citizens.").
79. Id. at 22-23.
80. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4) ("All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.").
81. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 74, at 25. ("Moreover, the Charter clearly
declares that United Nations member-states will respect human rights (which
encompass democratic freedoms), be peace-loving, and be committed to the
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include solving international problems of a humanitarian nature,
"promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms," and advancing respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.8 2 The Article 1
purposes also include the maintenance of international peace and
security, the prevention of threats to the peace, and the
suppression of acts of aggression.8 3 Although these broader
purposes could be viewed as being in tension with the Reagan
Doctrine, such objections could be addressed by saying that Sovietbacked regimes were themselves threats to international peace
and security because of their totalitarian policies.
Jeane Kirkpatrick's was a highly selective reading of Article
1, but it at least facially allowed her to take the next step,
84
asserting that the U.N. Charter, created to advance these values,
should not be interpreted to inhibit actions designed to bring about
the achievement of these purposes. The U.N. Charter, "which was
essentially American in design, was neither created nor viewed as
providing a protective shield for the expansion of repressive
Accordingly, the application and
dictatorships or empires."85
narrowly construed, could not
Doctrine,
of
the
Reagan
enforcement
violate the U.N. Charter because it only intended to curtail this
expansion.
The key ingredients in this approach were the necessity, in
any country in which it might be applied, for an indigenous
liberation movement and the existence of foreign totalitariansupported domination of its regime. Without the indigenous
liberation movement, even by Kirkpatrick's analysis, selfdetermination of the type heralded in the Declaration of
And without foreign
Independence would not be at issue.
domination, it could be more difficult to claim that the ruling
government, even if communist, was imposed without the consent

maintenance of world peace.").
82. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, paras. 2, 3.
83. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 1.
84. Although the Charter provisions described above do refer generally to such
concepts as "the principle of equal rights" (id. at art. 1, para. 2) and "respect for
human rights" (id. at art. 1, para. 3), they include these concepts principally as a
means of assuring international co-operation rather than as substantive
guarantees of the values they represent. For example, Article 1, Section 2 of the
Charter references "the principle of equal rights" as one of several "appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace," rather than stating equality as a specific
guarantee granted to individuals under the Charter. Id. at art. 1, para. 2. Other
documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights perform this
function. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
85. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 74, at 25-26.
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of the governed.
The primary action in U.S. foreign policy that Kirkpatrick
conceded represented the Reagan Doctrine was the assistance
provided by the United States to the Contra movement from 1981
to 1986.86 The Contras were a group of Nicaraguan insurgents
using violent means to destabilize and overthrow Nicaragua's
leftist Sandinista regime.8 7 That Kirkpatrick could say that only
this example was a true illustration of the Reagan Doctrine, while
others included a whole raft of U.S. actions, resulted in part from
the lack of an authoritative statement of the Doctrine's content
from the President himself.88 Indeed, as noted earlier, President
Reagan seemed somewhat diffident in describing the Doctrine that
came to bear his name. In a 1988 speech at Fort McNair in
Washington, D.C., Reagan's diffidence was evident:
Around the world, in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and, yes,
Central America, the United States stands today with those
who would fight for freedom. We stand with ordinary people
who have had the courage to take up arms against Communist
tyranny. This stand8 9is at the core of what some have called
the Reagan Doctrine.
President Reagan's refusal to clearly state that the Doctrine
was his own, and his choice to use the "what some have called"
locution, seems to indicate a lack of complete comfort with
enunciating his policy as a formal doctrine. At the same time, his
formulation at this speech does reflect the two essential
the indigenous
ingredients from Kirkpatrick's description:
rebellious groups ("ordinary people who have had the courage to
take up arms") and foreign domination ("Communist tyranny"). 90
Despite Jeane Kirkpatrick's attempts to justify the Reagan
Doctrine in terms of the U.N. Charter, some in the international
86. President Reagan campaigned on a platform of cutting all aid to the leftist
Sandinista regime, and as President (having taken office in 1981), he stepped up
U.S. activities against them. LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS 1 (1993). Congress prohibited
the CIA from spending money to help overthrow the Sandinista regime in 1982
(Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793 (1982)).
However, through the now-discredited "Iran-Contra" operation, de facto U.S.
support for the Contras continued surreptitiously until November 1986. WALSH,
supra, at 24. At that point, the Administration admitted to Congress that the
operations had continued contrary to law; certain persons who had been involved
left the Administration. Id.
87. WALSH, supra note 86, at 1.
88. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
89. President's Remarks at the National Defense University on Signing the
Department of Veterans Affairs Act, 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1381, 1382 (Oct. 25,
1988) (emphasis added).
90. Id.
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Indeed, the
community disagreed with her assessment.
International Court of Justice (ICJ) was given the singular
opportunity to review the legality of the real-world application of
the Reagan Doctrine when it decided the case brought before it in
1984, by Nicaragua against the United States. 91
V. The Reagan Doctrine Before the ICJ
On June 27, 1986, the ICJ at The Hague delivered its
judgment in Military and Paramilitary Activities.92 The ICJ
determined that the United States, "by training, arming,
equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces . . . against
Nicaragua, has acted . . . in breach of its obligation under
customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of
another state."93 Since this pattern of training and arming the
Contras was consistent with, and indeed an impetus for the
Reagan Doctrine, the ICJ essentially determined that the Reagan
Doctrine, at least under the facts of that case, violated
international law.
However, apologists for the Reagan Doctrine could still take
comfort in various aspects of the situation surrounding the ICJ
judgment. First, and most formally, one could argue that the ICJ
had no jurisdiction to decide the case. Before the ICJ, the United
States had several arguments for a lack of jurisdiction. These
were principally that Nicaragua had never effectively submitted to
the compulsory jurisdiction of the court, 94 that the United States
had effectively withdrawn from the compulsory jurisdiction of the
court prior to the filing of Nicaragua's claim, 95 and that not all
parties to the relevant treaties were parties to the case before the
court. 96 In a preliminary ruling specifically devoted to the issue of
91. Nicaragua filed its Application before the ICJ on April 9, 1984. The ICJ
decided the case principally in two phases, the first judgment addressing the
question of its jurisdiction in 1984, and the second judgment addressing the merits
in 1986. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (stating the Court's rulings
both on the merits and the jurisdictional points).
92. Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
27).
93. Id. at 146.
94. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 398413 (Nov. 26) (addressing in paragraphs 15-47 the United States' argument that a
Nicaraguan declaration of compulsory jurisdiction dated September 24, 1929 was
ineffective).
95. Id. at 415-21 (addressing in paragraphs 52-66 the United States' argument
that on April 6, 1984 the United States had effectively deposited with the U.N.
Secretary-General a document withdrawing the previous U.S. declaration of
compulsory jurisdiction).
96. Id. at 421-26 (addressing in paragraphs 67-76, the United States' argument
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jurisdiction, the ICJ dismissed all of the United States'
98
arguments, 97 and determined that it did indeed have jurisdiction.
However, if the ICJ's jurisdictional judgment was wrongly decided,
its judgment over the United States' support of the Contras should
be a nullity in virtually any tradition. For this reason, apologists
for the Reagan Doctrine could ignore the ICJ's determination on
the merits. 99
Second, and only somewhat less formally, decisions by the
ICJ are not supposed to have precedential effect. The Statute of
the ICJ,1°° executed and ratified simultaneously with the U.N.
Charter, explicitly states that its decisions have "no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular
case."10 1 This provision can be rationally interpreted to mean that
decisions of the ICJ do not take on the effects of stare decisis.
Accordingly, it can serve as a basis for an assertion that prior ICJ
decisions should not limit policy options of states acting later in
time. Nevertheless, even though ICJ decisions do not have formal
binding effect, they are cited in ICJ proceedings, and in political

that the terms of the U.S. declaration of compulsory jurisdiction required the
participation of all parties to certain treaties stated in Nicaragua's Application
before the court.
97. Id. at 413 (concluding in paragraph 47 that Nicaragua's subsequent behavior
"constitutes a valid mode of manifestation of its intent to recognize the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court," thus negating the first U.S. argument described above);
id. at 421 (concluding in paragraph 65 that the April 6, 1984 document deposited
by the United States afforded inadequate notice for an effective withdrawal from
compulsory jurisdiction, thus negating the second U.S. argument described above);
id. at 425-26 (concluding in paragraph 76 that the U.S. objection to a failure of
participation by certain parties "does not possess . . . an exclusively preliminary
character," thereby negating the third U.S. argument described above).
98. Id. at 442 (stating the court's judgment in favor of jurisdiction).
99. Regardless of one's perspective on the Reagan Doctrine, the ICJ's
jurisdictional ruling was subject to substantial criticism. For example, Thomas
Franck, among others, has noted that the ICJ's jurisdictional determinations in the
Nicaragua case had real effects in the United States, lessening the stature of the
court in the eyes of many Americans:
At least as far as Americans are concerned, the World Court did not do
itself a favor when it dismissed opportunities to duck the case brought by
Nicaragua against the United States. No doubt the majority of judges
believed themselves bound in law and honor not to turn a deaf ear to
demands for justice by a small state claiming to have been victimized by a
more powerful one. But in giving Nicaragua the benefit of several
procedural and jurisdictional doubts, the World Court put itself into a
position of fundamentally damaging its relations with its most important
constituent: the United States.
THOMAS M. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT 53 (1986).
100. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179.
101. Id. at art. 59, 59 Stat. at 1062, 3 Bevans at 1190.
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discourse, for their persuasive effect.102
Finally, when the voters of Nicaragua ultimately had the
freedom to vote, they elected the opposition to the Sandinista
regime. In the sense of realpolitik, this can be seen as a kind of
vindication for the underlying assumptions of the Reagan
Doctrine. After all, the Reagan Doctrine, as stated by Kirkpatrick,
relied on a conception of self-determination. 103
The U.S.
intervention was assertedly designed to facilitate that selfdetermination by means of covert military operations, and once an
election took place within Nicaragua, the forces against which
those operations were directed, in fact, were also defeated at the
polls.
The ICJ decision in the Nicaragua case indicates much of the
international community's disapproval of the Reagan Doctrine.
However, the decision did not put the Doctrine completely to rest,
either in narrow legal terms or in the much broader geopolitical
sense. Thus, a future United States foreign policy, according to
which the United States could insert itself into the internal affairs
of other countries when legitimate threats were thought to exist,
remained possible.
VI. The National Security Strategy-More Radical than
the Reagan Doctrine
The NSS is significant because, as indicated above, it seems
to have presaged, and served as part of the policy basis for, the

102. One leading authority, who has devoted much of an entire book to issues in
this area, summarizes the point in this way:
There is no reason to believe that any lawyer from anywhere has any
special difficulty in coming to terms with the methods of reasoning
employed by the [ICJ]. It is possible, however, that a lawyer formed in the
traditions of the common law may feel rather at home, if somewhat
strangely so, in the way the Court has recourse to its previous decisions in
the process of determining the law. The principal difference, he will be
told, is that stare decisis does not apply; and, indeed, largely because of
this important fact, it is sometimes said that it is not right to speak of
'precedents' in the case of decisions of the Court. But the fact that the
doctrine of binding precedent does not apply means that decisions of the
Court are not binding precedents; it does not mean that they are not
'precedents'. The term occurs in the jurisprudence of the Court; it occurs
also in the pleadings of counsel and in the writings of publicists.
MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 2 (1996) (citations
omitted).
103. See Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 74, at 22-23 (describing Jeane
Kirkpatrick's reliance on the U.S. Declaration of Independence, and its idea that, in
her words, "the legitimacy of a government depends on its respect for individual
rights and on the consent of the governed," as a basis for a narrow view of the
Reagan Doctrine).
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U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March of 2003. This was a momentous
event on the world stage, and the policy statement was designed to
furnish a foundation for it in principle. What is the relationship
between that policy statement and the Reagan Doctrine?
In comparison to the narrow conception of the Reagan
Doctrine, the modern Bush Doctrine is much more radical. Most
obvious is the Reagan Doctrine's insistence on the existence of an
indigenous rebellion in order for the Doctrine to apply. When the
NSS, on the other hand, calls for preemptive action against
terrorists,10 4 or for preemptive action to forestall or prevent hostile
acts by our adversaries, 10 5 it does not require an indigenous
This shows a fundamental difference in purpose
rebellion.
between the two doctrines: the Reagan Doctrine purports to aid
self-determination in the face of communist domination, while the
Bush Doctrine operates in self-defense against terrorism.
However, a direct comparison is still legitimate, because both
serve as policy bases for the use of force, indirect in one case and
direct in the other, for intervention in foreign states.
This distinction is significant in terms of the primary realworld consequence of the NSS so far, the U.S.-led invasion and
occupation of Iraq. The U.S. and British governments stated that,
prior to the invasion, the Iraqi population was being victimized by
Saddam Hussein's regime. 10 6 However, there was no pretense that
there was a substantial indigenous armed resistance movement
that the invasion was primarily designed to assist. 10 7 Rather, the
invasion was simply an instance of direct military intervention in
a particular state by the armed forces of other states. This
distinguishes the Iraqi invasion from the U.S. support for the
08
Contras.
Thus, at least in this sense, the NSS approach is more radical
than the narrow conception of the Reagan Doctrine. If the Reagan
Doctrine's insistence on the existence of an indigenous rebel group
is no longer required for the use of force, an important restraint on
104. NSS, supra note 2, at 6.
105. Id. at 14-15.
106. See, e.g., Associated Press, Bush Tells Iraqi People: Regime Being Removed,
HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 10, 2003, http://www.houstonchronicle.com/.
107. Although resistance groups had been active in Iraq during earlier periods,
they had been suppressed by Saddam Hussein's regime. By the time the U.S. and
U.K. forces mounted their principal invasion in March of 2003, most such groups
could offer minimal assistance at best.
108. It does not necessarily distinguish the Iraqi invasion from the U.S. mining
of Nicaraguan harbors, but Ambassador Kirkpatrick had asserted that the mining
operation was not an aspect of the Reagan Doctrine. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra
note 74, at 19.
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the use of force is absent. Accordingly, the NSS approach tends to
allow for a more unbridled use of force against other states than
would have been permitted under the Reagan Doctrine.
The Reagan Doctrine itself may have been a radical
departure from established mores, in part because it purported to
allow external support for insurgents against an established
government. The U.N. Charter does not explicitly forbid military
assistance to insurgents in other countries, but Article 2(4)'s
prohibition of force against the territorial integrity and political
independence of states has been interpreted to prevent such
external armed support for insurgents.10 9 However, to the extent
that the situation in Nicaragua was a civil war, the Reagan
Doctrine becomes less radical. There is at least some authority for
the proposition that outside armed assistance for one or the other
party in a civil war does not violate Article 2(4) as long as the
externally supported use of force is "bona fide and the intervenor
was not seeking to dominate the side it supported and establish a
puppet regime." 110
Another basis for distinguishing the NSS from the Reagan
Doctrine is their respective manners of propagation. As noted
earlier, the Reagan Doctrine was never clearly adopted as such by
President Reagan himself.111
Ambassador Kirkpatrick, not
Reagan or the White House, ultimately declared its existence and
tried to limit its scope. 112 However, there was enough ambiguity
among the various presidential and cabinet pronouncements that
particular manifestations could be adopted or denied depending on
the wishes of various political actors from one instance to the next.
By comparison, the propagation of the NSS has been
startlingly bold. It was announced, in effect, on official White
House stationery by means of posting over the internet at the
White House website.
It even appears under the electronic
signature of President Bush. It is florid and expansive,1 13 in
109. See HENKIN, supra note 11, at 303-08 (asserting that military intervention
in a civil war was not acceptable under traditional international law).
110. Id. at 307.
111. See, e.g., supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (analyzing a public
statement made by President Reagan regarding the Reagan Doctrine, in which he
said that "some have called" his views the "Reagan doctrine," and noting that
Reagan's diffidence is evident).
112. See, e.g., supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (describing statements
made by Jeane Kirkpatrick suggesting that "the Reagan Doctrine was narrowly
focused on the 'moral legitimacy' of U.S. support for indigenous insurgencies in
communist states").
113. A suitable example illustrating the florid and expansive tendencies of the
NSS is the following:
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contrast with the comparatively sparse and terse statements of
President Reagan. 114 Much of the focus of the NSS is broad, 115 and
can be susceptible to varying interpretations in varying contexts.
However, this simply expands the scope of the yardstick by which
later policy can be judged. The NSS may be broad enough to
support a wide array of policies, but by the same token that very
breadth makes it easier for detractors to challenge later actions as
inconsistent with the policy. The comparative boldness of the
enunciation of the NSS is a radical change from the diffident, and
initially almost furtive, manner in which the Reagan Doctrine was
announced and expanded.
The NSS offers a more radical vision of foreign policy as well.
One of the aspects of the Reagan Doctrine, perceived as an
advantage at the time, was its comparatively "low-risk
character." 1 6 Because the narrow Reagan doctrine relied on the
existence of indigenous armed rebels, the scope of U.S.
involvement would necessarily be lessened in effectuation of the
Doctrine. The United States might supply extra armaments, but
it would not be responsible for the entire military operation.
Similarly, the United States might supply training and advisors,
but the role of infantry or its equivalent would be fulfilled by the
indigenous rebels. Indeed, this was largely the pattern for most of
the U.S. assistance provided to the Contras, at least insofar as
11 7
that assistance was representative of the Reagan Doctrine.
The NSS, however, involves both specifically and by
implication the out-and-out use of U.S. armed forces to engage in
military operations in foreign states. 1 8 The U.S. military can be
responsible for all phases of the operation, and much more can be
at risk, both in terms of lives and economic resources. This is a
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every person-in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has been
threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the clashing wills
of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and it has been tested by
widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds in its hands the
opportunity to further freedom's triumph over all these foes. The United
States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission.
NSS, supra note 2, at Intro.
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radical departure from the precepts of the Reagan Doctrine.
Conclusion
The preceding review of the Reagan Doctrine and President
Bush's National Security Strategy has uncovered two distinct
points of comparison that seem to cut in opposite directions. First,
the NSS represents a widely disseminated and publicly stated
official White House declaration. 119 It is broad in scope and
contains statements of general outlook and priorities on the part of
the Bush Administration. 120 At the same time, many of its
statements are sufficiently precise and directed to constitute
meaningful indications of particular policies.' 21 The issuance of
any such document, as a formal matter, can have salutary effects
on the development of customary international law. This is
because the enunciation of principles can help encourage both
predictability and consistency of action, and also the formation of
opino juris.
Second, however, the substantive import of the NSS, to the
extent it addresses preemptive self-defense, is intensely
problematic for international law. The assertions stated in the
NSS run counter to many established understandings of the U.N.
Charter and the ICJ's ruling in the Nicaragua case. 22 The NSS, a
more radical departure than the Reagan Doctrine, may be an
indication of the particular status of the United States. 23 It was
one thing for the United States to assert the right to assist others
as a matter of self-determination, but quite another for the United
States to assert the capacity to unilaterally invade other countries
124
whether indigenous resistance movements are present or not.
Accordingly, declarations such as the NSS are a potentially
positive development for international law, while the substance of
the NSS itself presents potentially negative aspects for
international law. This dichotomy may become characteristic of
the foreign policy operations of the United States if it continues to
occupy the role of a sole superpower. On the one hand, its position
of strategic primacy may provide the United States with the
security necessary to make detailed and wide-ranging
pronouncements about its intentions, goals, and priorities, and
119. NSS, supra note 2.
120. Id.
121. Id.

122. Supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
123. Supra Part VI.
124. Supra Part VI.
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may also give it the independence to make good on such
pronouncements. Such behavior can increase the predictability
and consistency of U.S. foreign policy and its effect on
international law. On the other hand, the same primacy may
encourage the United States, as a substantive matter, to stake out
positions that are more problematic under international law,
seeking greater advantage for itself on the world stage.
This dual character of U.S. foreign policy operation can thus
serve both positive and negative results in the development of
international law and the conduct of foreign relations in general.
Time will tell if the pattern becomes general and a fixture of
international affairs in the years to come.

